While U.S. senators publicly push for Somaliland’s recognition in Washington, Villa Somalia is sending top officials to Beijing for seminars and ceremonial receptions. At a moment when Somalia’s sovereignty faces one of its most critical tests in decades, the government seems distracted by photo opportunities with China—offering no aid, no investment, and no military cooperation.
Somalia stands at a dangerous crossroads in its foreign policy. As Somaliland’s recognition campaign gains momentum in Washington—especially among advisers close to the President Donald Trump—Mogadishu risks alienating its most important ally, the United States, by chasing symbolic gestures from Beijing that deliver nothing of real value.
For two decades, the United States has been Somalia’s most crucial partner, providing billions in military aid, humanitarian support, and direct budget assistance. American forces have defended Somalia from Al-Shabaab, carried out precision airstrikes, and trained elite units like the Danab Commandos. The U.S. also led the push for historic debt relief under the IMF and World Bank, unlocking desperately needed financing. These are strategic commitments, not empty optics.
In contrast, Beijing’s presence over the past five years has amounted to little more than workshops, short trainings, scholarships, and staged receptions—polished appearances with no substance. Even repeated meetings between the Chinese ambassador and Somali leaders seem aimed less at development than at pressuring Mogadishu to echo China’s positions on Taiwan and Somaliland. As one senior Somali official put it, China invests only in “visibility, not responsibility.”
The real danger lies not with top leadership but with lower-level officials, enticed by foreign trips, stipends, and prestige. Their enthusiasm for Beijing’s gestures serves personal ambition, not Somalia’s strategic interests.
At this pivotal moment, Mogadishu cannot misread American sentiment. Any perception that Somalia is drifting toward Beijing could weaken the bipartisan U.S. support it has long relied on. Engaging China is not inherently wrong—but it must serve national interests, not personal perks.
Somalia must anchor its foreign policy in reality: the U.S. has paid in blood and treasure to stabilize the country, while China has spent little more than the cost of hotel receptions. The government must prioritize the strategic prize: preserving Washington’s trust and support, especially as Somaliland intensifies its recognition campaign. Anything less would be a gift to Somaliland and a self-inflicted wound to Somalia’s sovereignty.
