By Dawan Africa - Editorial
The sharp Somali divide over the decision to cancel bilateral agreements with the United Arab Emirates has exposed deep fragility in the country’s internal situation—one that goes beyond foreign policy or the management of relations with regional partners and strikes at the very core of the governing model in place. Regardless of the merits of the decision taken by the Council of Ministers, the reactions of the federal member states laid bare a structural flaw that has been quietly deepening within Somalia’s political system.
At its heart, the dispute was not really about the UAE, but about who holds decision-making authority, and who defines the boundaries of power between the federal center and the states. The rejection of the federal government’s decision by Puntland and Jubaland highlighted profound differences in how the federal system itself is understood—particularly with regard to sovereign authority and decision-making mechanisms in areas traditionally considered the exclusive domain of the central state, foremost among them foreign policy and international agreements.
What is striking in this debate is that all parties—the federal government and the states alike—invoked provisions of the Provisional Constitution to justify their opposing positions. The constitution, which should serve as a unifying reference, has instead become a text open to conflicting interpretations, allowing each side to find within it support for its own narrative. Puntland and Jubaland went further by citing their respective state constitutions as additional sources of legitimacy, granting them what they argue is the right to object to, or act independently from, federal decisions.
Here lies the core of the problem: the multiplicity of constitutional references within a single state. Alongside the national Provisional Constitution—many of whose articles are marked by deliberate ambiguity, sometimes to the point of contradiction—there now exist “parallel” state constitutions. These are no less ambiguous or assertive, and in some respects tend to hollow out the federal system itself, reducing it to a largely symbolic framework encompassing quasi-autonomous entities.
This reality reflects a failure to agree on a single governing reference for Somalia, or at least to reconcile the national Provisional Constitution with the constitutions of the federal member states. The constitutional process, which was supposed to resolve these issues through the completion of a permanent constitution, has remained stalled for years. In the meantime, transitional texts—exhausted by interpretation and shaped by temporary political compromises—have hardened into semi-permanent rules.
It cannot be denied that the authors of state constitutions were often motivated by legitimate concerns. The fear of a return to centralized dictatorship—concentrating power in the hands of one individual or group—has loomed large in Somali political consciousness since the era of military rule. Yet in practice, these constitutions have shifted from being safeguards against authoritarianism to instruments of fragmentation. They have contributed to the emergence of “de facto” entities that formally belong to the federal system while exercising powers that rival, and at times exceed, those of the central state in sensitive domains.
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Over time, disputes between the center and the states have ceased to be exceptions and have instead become a recurring pattern, resurfacing whenever a sovereign issue or strategic decision is placed on the table. The federal system has gradually shifted from a mechanism for power-sharing and managing diversity into an open arena for contestation over authority—one in which effective constitutional arbitration mechanisms are absent, and political power balances prevail over legal texts.
From this perspective, the division over relations with the UAE cannot be separated from a deeper Somali dilemma: what kind of governing model do Somalis actually want? Is it a clearly defined federal system with precise delineation of powers between the center and the states, or a hybrid arrangement governed by temporary bargains and perpetual reinterpretation? Is foreign policy an exclusive sovereign prerogative of the federal government, or an open field for regional maneuvering based on local interests?
The continuation of this state of affairs weakens Somalia both domestically and internationally. Internally, it entrenches division and erodes trust among the components of the political system. Externally, it confuses regional and international partners and encourages selective engagement with different actors, rather than dealing with a single state possessing a unified decision-making authority.
More dangerously, the absence of a final, broadly agreed constitutional reference means that every political crisis is liable to become an existential test for the entire system. What occurred in the UAE file could easily recur in even more sensitive areas—such as security, natural resources, or regional relations—unless a serious debate is reopened on the future of federal governance itself.
What is needed today is not merely the management of a passing political crisis, but a confrontation with a long-postponed question: Do we want a federalism that organizes the state, or a federalism that legitimizes fragmentation? The answer cannot emerge from ad hoc decisions or temporary understandings, but only through completing a permanent constitution, unifying governing references, and building a credible constitutional arbitration system capable of resolving disputes before they escalate into national crises.
In the end, Somalis may differ over their stance toward the United Arab Emirates or any other external actor. What they should not differ over is the fact that continued constitutional ambiguity and competing legal references threaten the very idea of the state. The current divide is yet another warning that Somalia’s governing model requires a courageous reassessment—before political disagreements harden into fractures that are difficult to repair.
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