Debates surrounding Somalia’s foreign agreements—particularly those involving ports, security cooperation, and military arrangements—have repeatedly exposed a fundamental misunderstanding of the country’s constitutional order. At the center of these disputes lies a core legal question: Do Somalia’s Federal Member States possess the authority to independently enter binding agreements with foreign governments?
Under both Somali constitutional law and international law, the answer is clear and unambiguous: they do not. The power to conduct foreign relations, conclude treaties, and represent the Somali state internationally rests exclusively with the Federal Government of Somalia.
This legal reality is not a matter of political interpretation or institutional preference; it is grounded in the text of the Somali Provisional Constitution and reinforced by well-established principles of international law governing state sovereignty and international legal personality.
Foreign Relations Under Somali Constitutional Law
The Somali Provisional Constitution provides a clear allocation of powers between the federal center and the Federal Member States. Article 54 of the Constitution explicitly centralizes authority over foreign affairs, stating that matters related to foreign policy, diplomacy, treaties, and international agreements fall under the exclusive competence of the Federal Government.
This provision leaves little room for ambiguity. While Somalia’s federal system allows for decentralization in internal governance—such as local administration, service delivery, and regional development—it does not extend to the international sphere. Federal Member States are not constitutionally empowered to recognize foreign states, negotiate treaties, or enter into military, security, or diplomatic agreements with foreign governments.
The constitutional logic is straightforward: Somalia is a single sovereign state, and sovereignty cannot be fragmented among its constituent units. International representation must therefore be exercised by one authority, acting on behalf of the state as a whole.
Attempts by regional administrations to justify independent foreign agreements often rely on selective readings of federalism or on regional constitutions. However, under Somalia’s constitutional hierarchy, regional constitutions cannot override or contradict the national constitution. Any regional legal framework that claims foreign-relations authority operates outside constitutional legality, regardless of political realities on the ground.
Federalism Does Not Equal International Personality
A critical distinction often overlooked in public discourse is the difference between internal federal autonomy and international legal personality. Federalism determines how power is shared within a state; it does not determine who represents the state externally.
Under international law, only entities possessing international legal personality may conclude treaties and enter binding agreements with other states. In Somalia’s case, that personality belongs solely to the Federal Government of Somalia.
Federal Member States are administrative and political entities created by the national constitutional framework. They are not subjects of international law. They cannot claim sovereign equality, treaty-making capacity, or diplomatic standing independent of the federal state.
This principle is consistent across federal systems worldwide. Whether in Germany, Ethiopia, Nigeria, or the United States, subnational entities may engage in limited technical cooperation or commercial outreach abroad—but only within parameters authorized by the federal constitution and never in a way that creates binding international obligations for the state.
In Somalia’s case, even that limited scope is narrowly defined. Any engagement with foreign governments that carries legal, military, or diplomatic consequences requires federal authorization.
Treaty Law and International Practice
The international legal framework governing treaties reinforces Somalia’s constitutional position. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, only states and recognized subjects of international law may conclude treaties. Agreements signed by entities lacking treaty-making capacity are considered legally invalid under international law, regardless of their practical implementation.
Foreign governments engaging directly with Somali regional administrations therefore do so at legal risk. Such agreements cannot acquire international legal validity unless endorsed by the Federal Government. Even if implemented de facto, they remain vulnerable to annulment, dispute, or international non-recognition.
This is why most states and international organizations insist on dealing exclusively with Somalia’s federal authorities on matters of national competence. Deviating from this practice undermines the principle of state sovereignty and exposes external actors to diplomatic and legal complications.
The Misuse of Federalism in Political Argument
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A recurring problem in Somalia’s political discourse is the instrumentalization of federalism as a justification for unilateral external engagement. Federalism is often portrayed as implying shared or divided sovereignty, when in fact it is a mechanism for internal power distribution within a sovereign state.
Somalia’s federal arrangement was designed to prevent excessive centralization after decades of authoritarian rule, not to authorize parallel foreign policies. The constitution deliberately preserves unity in external representation to safeguard territorial integrity and prevent international fragmentation.
When Federal Member States claim the right to independently negotiate foreign agreements, they are not exercising federal autonomy—they are asserting a form of external sovereignty that the constitution does not grant. This creates legal incoherence and invites external interference, particularly in a region marked by intense geopolitical competition.
Consequences of Constitutional Ambiguity
While the constitutional text is clear on foreign relations, Somalia’s prolonged transitional phase has weakened enforcement. The absence of a finalized constitutional court and the persistence of political bargaining have allowed unconstitutional practices to emerge and persist.
This gap between law and practice carries significant risks. It blurs the lines of authority, confuses international partners, and weakens Somalia’s negotiating position. More critically, it transforms constitutional violations into political precedents, gradually eroding the state’s external coherence.
Over time, repeated unilateral actions by regional administrations—if left unaddressed—can normalize a parallel foreign policy environment, even though it lacks legal foundation. This is not federalism; it is constitutional drift.
Reaffirming the Legal Order
Restoring clarity requires more than political statements. It demands institutional reinforcement of constitutional norms. The Federal Government must consistently assert its exclusive authority over foreign relations, while international partners must respect Somalia’s constitutional framework by engaging solely through federal channels.
Equally important is advancing the stalled constitutional process. Completing the permanent constitution, clarifying federal competences, and establishing an effective constitutional adjudication mechanism are essential steps to prevent future disputes from escalating into systemic crises.
Conclusion
Under Somali constitutional law and international law, the issue is settled: Federal Member States do not possess independent authority to enter binding agreements with foreign governments. That power resides exclusively with the Federal Government of Somalia.
Federalism divides governance, not sovereignty. Somalia remains one sovereign state, represented internationally by one authority. Any arrangement that ignores this principle is not only unconstitutional but legally void under international law.
As Somalia navigates complex regional and global pressures, adherence to constitutional legality is not a technical detail—it is a prerequisite for preserving statehood, credibility, and international standing.
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Avv. Omar Abdulle “Dhagey” is a Somali legal and political analyst specializing in governance and institutional reform.
Email: omardhagey@gmail.com
The opinion expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa
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