For more than three decades, Somalis have asked the same painful question: who destroyed our state? The answers are often emotional, selective, and shaped by clan loyalty, political alignment, or personal memory. Yet if Somalia is to move forward, this question must be answered honestly—not to reopen wounds, but to learn from them.
The truth is uncomfortable: the failure of the Somali state was not caused by one man, one clan, or one moment in history. It was the result of accumulated failures—of leadership, institutions, political culture, and collective responsibility.
Somalia’s early years after independence were filled with hope and promise. However, that promise was gradually undermined by political elites who prioritized clan-based competition over national governance. Corruption, patronage, and short-term political bargaining weakened institutions that were still fragile. Democracy existed in form, but not in discipline. These early failures laid the groundwork for deeper collapse.
The military regime that seized power in 1969 bears a heavier responsibility. By abolishing constitutional rule and concentrating authority in the hands of a few, it dismantled institutional checks and balances. Over time, repression replaced dialogue, fear replaced trust, and loyalty to individuals replaced loyalty to the state. When the regime collapsed in 1991, it left behind no lawful mechanism for transition—only weapons, grievances, and a hollowed-out state.
What followed was not liberation, but fragmentation. Armed factions and warlords turned cities into battlefields and public assets into private loot. Rather than rebuilding the state, they built personal empires fueled by violence and humanitarian aid. Reconciliation was repeatedly postponed—not because it was impossible, but because peace threatened their power.
Clan elders and political gatekeepers also carry responsibility. Instead of using tradition to heal and unite, many allowed clan identity to be weaponized. Criminality was shielded under kinship, merit was sacrificed for loyalty, and national citizenship was weakened by sub-clan entitlement. A society cannot build a state when belonging matters more than law.
Since the early 2000s, Somalia has had internationally recognized governments and a framework of federal governance intended to prevent a return to authoritarianism. Yet the political class that emerged often treated public office as a business venture rather than a public trust. Institutions remained weak, corruption persisted, and accountability was minimal. Too often, political survival was mistaken for state-building, and external support substituted for domestic legitimacy.
Within this framework, Federal Member States have also played a role in prolonging state failure. Federalism was adopted to manage diversity, decentralize power, and promote inclusion. In practice, however, it has frequently been implemented without constitutional clarity or cooperative spirit. Many Federal Member State leaders have behaved as heads of autonomous political entities rather than partners in a single republic. Parallel diplomacy, independent security arrangements, and unilateral control over resources have undermined national cohesion and weakened federal authority.
Rather than strengthening governance at the grassroots, several regional administrations reproduced the same failures found at the center: clan favoritism, weak accountability, delayed or manipulated elections, and suppression of political competition. Federalism, instead of correcting centralized abuse, often became a mechanism for institutionalized division. Disputes between the federal government and member states over power-sharing, security integration, and constitutional responsibilities became chronic, paralyzing reform and eroding public confidence.
Federal Member States did not cause Somalia’s collapse, but their conduct since reconstitution has too often deepened fragmentation instead of healing it. Federalism cannot succeed when autonomy is treated as isolation and disagreement becomes obstruction. A functioning federal system requires mutual restraint, constitutional respect, and shared responsibility for national survival.
External actors also cannot be absolved. Cold War politics militarized Somalia and distorted its development. Regional interventions prioritized security interests over Somali sovereignty. International partners, in the name of stability, frequently supported weak political arrangements that lacked popular consent. Aid kept institutions alive, but it also reduced accountability to citizens and delayed difficult reforms.
Armed extremist groups exploited this environment. They fed on injustice, unemployment, and public anger, further eroding trust and security. Yet they were a symptom as much as a cause—born from prolonged state failure, not its origin.
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Finally, Somali society itself must reflect. States do not survive on leaders alone. Silence in the face of injustice, tolerance of corruption when it benefits one’s own group, and the normalization of lawlessness all contributed to the erosion of the state. Citizenship was demanded, but rarely defended.
Assigning responsibility is not about blame for its own sake. It is about learning. Somalia’s collapse teaches one central lesson: a state cannot stand without accountable leadership, strong institutions, and a civic culture that values law over identity.
If Somalia is to rise again, responsibility must be shared—and so must reform. Not through denial or revenge, but through truth, accountability, and a renewed commitment to citizenship over clan, institutions over individuals, and the future over the past.
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Avv. Omar Abdulle “Dhagey” is a Somali legal and political analyst specializing in governance and institutional reform.
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* The opinion expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa
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