By Summarized by Dawan Africa - -
In his analysis published by The Washington Institute, Ehud Yaari argues that Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland represents a significant strategic shift that signals Jerusalem’s return to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa after years of diplomatic and security setbacks.
Announced on December 26, 2025, the move makes Israel the first country to grant full recognition to Somaliland and has injected new momentum into a region already shaped by conflict in Yemen, instability in Somalia, and intensifying competition over critical maritime corridors.
Yaari frames Israel’s recognition primarily as a security-driven decision. Since the deterioration of Israel’s relations with Eritrea in 2020 and the collapse of normalization with Sudan following the outbreak of civil war there in April 2023, Israel has lacked reliable partners along the Red Sea littoral.
This strategic gap became acute after Yemen’s Houthi movement launched a sustained campaign in October 2023 targeting ships bound for Israel and firing missiles and drones toward Israeli territory. These attacks have effectively paralyzed the port of Eilat, Israel’s only outlet to the Red Sea—an outcome Israeli planners view as untenable in the long term.
Within this context, Somaliland’s geography has taken on renewed strategic importance. Stretching roughly 850 kilometers along the Gulf of Aden opposite Yemen, Somaliland sits near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, one of the world’s most vital maritime chokepoints.
Yaari stresses that Israel is not seeking to establish permanent military bases in Somaliland. Instead, Israeli interest centers on access rights and intelligence facilities that could be activated if confrontations with the Houthis resume, particularly in the event of a broader conflict involving Iran or Hamas.
The article also underscores Israel’s perception of Somaliland as a relatively stable and distinct political entity. Since declaring independence in 1991 following the collapse of the Somali state, Somaliland has maintained internal security, held multiple elections, and avoided the scale of terrorist violence that continues to afflict southern and central Somalia.
Normalization with Israel, Yaari notes, could extend beyond security cooperation to include Israeli civilian assistance in water management, agriculture, and information technology. Plans are already underway for a large Somaliland delegation to visit Israel, signaling an intention to deepen bilateral ties.
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Yaari situates Israel’s decision within a complex regional environment marked by caution and competing interests. Ethiopia, Somaliland’s closest neighbor, has long weighed recognition and in January 2025 signed a memorandum of understanding that would grant Addis Ababa access to the port of Berbera in exchange for recognition.
That arrangement, however, stalled amid political controversy, concerns over Somalia’s territorial integrity, and uncertainty over implementation. Taiwan has cultivated close economic and security cooperation with Somaliland, including support for its coast guard, yet has stopped short of formal recognition under pressure from China. The United Arab Emirates also maintains strong ties with Somaliland, particularly through port operations, but has similarly avoided recognition.
Arab reactions have been largely critical. Saudi Arabia publicly denounced Israel’s move as an attempt to establish “parallel entities” in Somalia, while some Arab media framed the decision as part of a broader Israeli–Emirati strategy linked to developments in Yemen. Somalia’s federal government responded by announcing the cancellation of Emirati port security and defense agreements—although Yaari notes that key ports such as Berbera and Bosaso are not under Mogadishu’s direct control. Bosaso, located in Puntland, remains especially significant given its cooperation with the UAE and its history of hosting U.S. military operations.
The article also sheds light on Israel’s calculations regarding Somalia itself. Some Israeli officials reportedly favored publicizing Israel’s quiet contacts with Mogadishu rather than recognizing Somaliland. However, Somalia’s failure to advance toward normalization with Israel, coupled with its increasing reliance on Turkish and Qatari military support amid intensifying al-Shabab attacks, ultimately pushed Israel to prioritize relations with Hargeisa.
Looking ahead, Yaari emphasizes that the broader impact of Israel’s recognition depends largely on the position of the United States. Somaliland’s leadership hopes Israel’s move will encourage Washington, as well as the United Kingdom and India, to reconsider their long-standing refusal to recognize the republic. If the United States were to follow Israel’s lead, Yaari argues, it could reshape international approaches to the Horn of Africa—despite the risk of further straining already troubled U.S.–Somalia relations.
Overall, the article presents Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as a calculated geopolitical gamble—one that offers Israel renewed strategic depth in the Red Sea but also carries the risk of deepening regional tensions and accelerating debates over sovereignty and statehood in the Horn of Africa.
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