More than two decades after federalism was formally adopted as Somalia’s system of governance, the country remains adrift—governed by a framework that lacks direction, unity, and a shared national purpose. What was intended to heal the wounds of state collapse and bring power closer to the people has instead deepened fragmentation and turned into a political theater where clan interests outweigh national cohesion.
Federalism was not born of consensus in Somalia—it was born out of political expediency. In the early 2000s, as the country struggled to emerge from civil war, federalism was introduced to appease regional actors and warlords, including those already running autonomous administrations like Puntland. But federalism was neither clearly defined nor widely understood. It was never internalized as a national project. Public awareness campaigns were nonexistent, and until today, many Somalis interpret federalism as “clan autonomy” rather than a system of just and balanced governance.
As a result, what exists today in Somalia is not a functional federation—but a divided state. Federal Member States are structured along clan lines, not on the basis of economic viability, geography, or administrative logic. Power-sharing has become a transactional game among elites, not a process grounded in constitutional law. Cooperation between the central government and the regions is minimal at best—and conflictual at worst. Each region operates its own armed forces, passes its own contradictory laws, and at times conducts its own foreign policy. This is not federalism—it is fragmentation.
The greatest obstacle to meaningful federalism is the incomplete Provisional Constitution, adopted in 2012 and still unfinished more than a decade later. Key issues such as resource-sharing, the structure of the judiciary, and fiscal arrangements remain unresolved. In the absence of legal clarity, Somalia is trapped in constitutional limbo. There is no independent constitutional court. No binding mechanism exists to resolve disputes between different levels of government. Political deadlock has become the norm.
Undefined federalism is not merely dysfunctional—it is dangerous. It has created overlapping institutions, exacerbated inequality between regions, and eroded the idea of a shared national identity. Increasingly, Somalis define themselves as “Somalilanders,” “Puntlanders,” or “Galmudug-landers,” instead of as citizens of one republic. Worse still, the persistent lack of internal consensus has left the door open for foreign actors to shape domestic political outcomes—undermining Somalia’s sovereignty in the process.
If this trajectory continues unchecked, Somalia may devolve into a collection of isolated regional entities—each governed by its own rules, with no common vision or national ambition.
But this outcome is not inevitable.
To save federalism—and the Somali state itself—urgent steps must be taken:
1. Finalize the Provisional Constitution, especially the chapters related to power-sharing, resource management, and the judiciary.
2. Establish an independent Constitutional Court to adjudicate intergovernmental disputes.
3. Reform the relationship between the federal government and the member states through binding legal frameworks, ongoing dialogue, and mutual respect.
4. Launch national awareness campaigns to educate the public on what federalism is—and what it is not.
5. Forge a comprehensive political agreement that prioritizes national unity over clan interests.
Somalia stands at a crossroads. It must choose between two futures: a balkanized collection of clan-based mini-states, or a cohesive federal republic rooted in law, guided by vision, and driven by shared national interest.
Federalism can still work in Somalia—but only if it is rescued from its current drift and reimagined as a tool for unity, not division.
Avv. Omar Abdulle “Dhagey” is a Somali legal and political analyst specializing in governance and institutional reform.
Email: omardhagey@gmail.com
