Opinion – Sovereignty Revisited: Constitutional Limits on Federal Authority in Somalia’s Foreign Relations

Editor’s Note: This article is published as part of an ongoing debate on Dawan Africa that began with an earlier opinion piece by Avv. Omar Abdulle “Dhagey.” The author below, Dr. Mohamud Uluso, presents a counter-argument, challenging key assumptions and conclusions raised in the original article. In the interest of open, rigorous, and constructive debate, Dawan Africa welcomes this contribution as part of its commitment to plural perspectives on critical regional and international issues.

Avv. Omar Abdulle’s opinion piece on “Sovereignty First: The Limits of Somalia’s Federal States in Foreign Relations,” published by Dawan Africa on 14 January 2026, asserts, with confidence, that Somalia’s Federal Government (FGS) enjoys exclusive and unqualified authority over foreign relations, while Federal Member States (FMS) possess no constitutional or legal role whatsoever in engagements with foreign governments.

 While this position may appear traditional in stable and consolidated federations, it collapses under closer scrutiny when applied to Somalia’s constitutional reality, institutional fragility, and unfinished federal order.

This comment does not seek to legitimize unconstitutional conduct by Federal Member States. Rather, it exposes a deeper and more consequential failure: the chronic negligence, dereliction of constitutional duty, and overreach of the Federal Government itself since 2012, which has forfeited the moral, political, and constitutional standing required to claim monopolistic authority over foreign relations.

1. The Central Fallacy: Abstract Sovereignty Detached from Reality

Avv. Omar’s analysis treats Somalia as a fully consolidated, constitutionally complete, territorially controlled federal state. It is not.

Somalia operates under a Provisional Federal Constitution, explicitly incomplete and unratified. The constitutional order remains transitional; the constitutional court has never been established; power- and resource-sharing arrangements remain unresolved; and federal–state constitutional harmonization has not occurred. These facts are not incidental; they are determinative.

To argue for absolute federal monopoly over foreign relations without acknowledging this incompleteness is legally simplistic and politically dangerous.

2. International Law Does Not Support the Author’s Absolutism

The author relies implicitly on classical doctrines of sovereignty and treaty law, yet overlooks their conditions of applicability.

Under Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, statehood requires:

          1.     Permanent population

         2.      Defined territory

         3.       Government

         4.      Capacity to enter relations with other states

While Somalia enjoys international recognition, its effective control, territorial reach, and representative legitimacy remain fractured. The President and Prime Minister cannot freely operate in Puntland, Jubbaland, Somaliland, or large territories controlled by Al-Shabaab. Somalia remains under UN Security Council Chapter VII, with international peacekeeping and trusteeship-like arrangements. 

Sovereignty in international law is not merely declaratory; it is functional and effective. Avv. Omar’s analysis ignores this.

3. Article 54 Cannot Be Read in Isolation

 The centrepiece of the author’s argument is Article 54, which allocates foreign affairs to the Federal Government. However, constitutional interpretation does not permit cherry-picking.

Article 53 explicitly limits Article 54, requiring:

• Mandatory consultation with FMS on treaties, aid, trade, and international negotiations

• Inclusion of FMS representatives when their interests are affected

• Recognition of the FGS as guardian of FMS interests, not their substitute

This is not symbolic language. It is a constitutional constraint. Any foreign engagement conducted without consultation violates the Constitution, regardless of whether the federal government signs the agreement.

Avv. Omar’s failure to consider Article 53 fundamentally undermines his thesis.

4. Federalism in Somalia Is Cooperative, Not Command-Based

Article 50 establishes mutual cooperation and support as the foundation of Somali federalism. Federalism in Somalia was designed to heal fragmentation, not re-centralize authority through presidential fiat.

Yet the FGS has:

• Failed to complete constitutional review (overdue since 2016)

• Failed to harmonize federal and state constitutions (Article 121)

• Failed to legislate core federal institutions, including the judiciary (Article 105) and security architecture (Article 130)

• Failed to resolve the constitutional status of Mogadishu/Benadir

A government that neglects these foundational duties cannot credibly invoke constitutional supremacy in foreign relations to silence FMS.

5. Selective Federalism and Double Standards

The Federal Government itself has normalized fragmented external engagement:

• Turkish companies manage Mogadishu port and airport

• Foreign actors collect revenue and operate security infrastructure

• Agreements are signed without parliamentary scrutiny or FMS consultation

Yet the same federal authority annuls similar arrangements by FMS under the banner of sovereignty. This is not constitutional governance; it is selective enforcement and political expediency.

6. Article 142 Protects Existing Federal Member State Powers

Article 142 preserves the powers of existing FMS until: