Kenya, 1 November 2025 - Kenya is embarking on another large-scale expressway project, the Rironi to Mau Summit (Mau–Narok) dialogue has already begun. On the surface it’s a straightforward promise: build fast roads, open up regions, reduce travel time. But in the world of toll roads and large infrastructure, the real test isn’t just construction, it’s whether the road pays its bills without saddling taxpayers with hidden costs.
Lessons from past projects
The Nairobi Expressway, billed as a user-pays solution to alleviate congestion, has under-performed financially. Despite toll revenue reaching about KSh 7.16 billion in a recent half-year, costs including loan repayments, operations and maintenance added up to roughly KSh 9 billion, leaving the operator with a loss of around KSh 1.84 billion.
This gap means that although traffic exists, the financial model is under pressure; when revenue falls short of debt servicing and upkeep, the project’s affordability for users and sustainability for lenders come into question. The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) also tells a cautionary tale. Funded largely by Chinese credit loans exceeding US$5 billion, the railway has struggled with lower-than-expected volumes.
Kenya responded by converting part of the loan into yuan to reduce interest costs, an indication that even major national projects may require restructuring when assumptions fail to hold.
What you should watch before new tolls roll out
When a new toll road is proposed, several key factors determine whether it will deliver value, or quietly become a liability. First is the traffic and revenue forecast: are the numbers realistic or optimistic? If vehicle volumes are overstated or payment compliance is weak, projections collapse. Second is toll tariff structure: how much will users pay, how often can tariffs rise, and are there good unpaid alternative routes?
Third is the concession duration and contract terms: what happens if revenue falls short? Does the state have to step in? Fourth is currency and debt risk: if financing is denominated in foreign currency, a depreciation of the Kenyan shilling can make debt servicing far costlier. Finally, local benefits matter: jobs, local suppliers, logistics, these add value beyond the road itself, but only if contracts enforce them.
Global precedents and their lessons
Across the world, toll road concessions have sometimes faltered. In Mexico in the 1990s, over twenty toll-road PPPs ran into trouble because traffic volumes failed to meet projections, leading to renegotiation or state takeover.
In Hungary, a PPP toll road collapsed when users shifted to a free parallel route, causing the operator to default and the government to step in. In Nigeria, Lagos State bought out the concession for the Lekki–Epe Expressway after public backlash over high tolls and affordability concerns, again leaving the state with the bill.
These cases illustrate a recurring cycle: private investment, mis-estimated demand, renegotiation, and public rescue.
Why this matters for Kenya’s economy and you
For Kenyan citizens, the implications are concrete. If toll revenue fails to meet projections, options include raising tolls (adding cost to everyday travel), cutting maintenance (reducing safety and lifespan), or the state stepping in to cover debts (redirecting public funds from health, education or services).
On the upside, a well-planned toll road can generate jobs during construction, expand market access for businesses, and foster regional growth, if managed effectively. Local transporters, suppliers of materials, logistics companies and small towns along the route can benefit if the value chain is anchored locally.
What Kenya must get right
For the Rironi–Mau Summit expressway and all future toll road projects, transparency and realism should be non-negotiable. Traffic forecasts must be conservative, contract terms publicly available, and contingent liabilities clearly spelled out. Citizens and media should demand to see the concession summary, guarantee terms and worst-case scenarios.
If those sit behind closed doors, risk grows. Kenya’s previous projects show that even high-profile infrastructure can strain public finances and that “no government debt” models can still carry fiscal risk.
Looking ahead
The government is already tendering the Rironi–Mau Summit project through a PPP structure led by major contractors and global lenders. With cost estimates around KSh 180–200 billion and projected toll earnings in the hundreds of billions over decades, the scale is enormous.
Whether the project succeeds or morphs into a fiscal burden hinges on the assumptions underpinning it: actual traffic volume, effective toll collection, competitive alternative routes, and robust regulation. If Kenya gets this right, the expressway could be transformative. If not, it may become another major infrastructure burden disguised as progress. In Kenya’s infrastructure story, ribbon-cuttings are easy. Paying the loans is harder, and it’s the payment phase that touches roads, budgets and citizens.
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