When examining the Abraham Accords signed in 2020, it is difficult to view them merely as transient bilateral normalization agreements between Israel and a number of Arab states. In their deeper structure and historical and political context, these accords appear closer to a new chapter in a long-term project that began more than a century ago with the Balfour Declaration of 1917, but which has now shifted from a phase of forced geographic establishment to one of comprehensive regional integration using softer and more sophisticated tools.
The Balfour Declaration was not simply a brief political message; it was a strategic statement aimed at establishing a national homeland for Jews in Palestine. This declaration did not emerge in a vacuum, but was preceded by decades of political, diplomatic, and organizational work by the Zionist movement in Europe and beyond, and was shaped by the international balance of power at the time. Thirty-one years after the declaration, the State of Israel was proclaimed in 1948, ushering the region into a new phase of conflict marked by direct military wars, mass displacement, and the redrawing of maps by force.
However, the establishment of the state—despite its repeated military victories over Arab armies—did not lead to regional acceptance. Israel remained isolated from its surroundings, encircled by widespread political and popular rejection, and deprived of natural integration into its geographic environment. Even the limited peace agreements later signed with some Arab states failed to end this isolation at the regional or popular level. Israel continued to rely for its security and survival on sustained and unlimited American support, which enabled it to achieve military and technological superiority over its neighbors combined.
This isolation, rather than the military threat alone, constituted one of Israel’s greatest strategic challenges. A state born by force and endowed with clear military superiority gradually realized that power alone was insufficient to guarantee long-term stability, and that regional acceptance—however partial—was an indispensable pillar for any future strategic project. From this perspective, the Abraham Accords can be read as an attempt to address this historical challenge not through war, but through economics, security, technology, and diplomacy.
The Abraham Accords opened a new chapter in Israel’s relationship with the Arab region, both in its immediate neighborhood and in the wider regional sphere. The essence of these agreements lies not merely in the exchange of ambassadors or the opening of air routes, but in a broader project aimed at ending Israel’s isolation and gradually integrating it into the Arab regional system. This integration proceeds through multiple tracks: economic and commercial cooperation, partnerships in technology, energy, and water, security and intelligence coordination, and ultimately cultural and political normalization that seeks to redefine Israel’s image in public consciousness.
In this sense, the Abraham Accords may be described as a “second version” of the Balfour Declaration, albeit with different tools and within a new international context. While the original declaration aimed to establish a political entity on Palestinian land, the new accords seek to consolidate that entity within its regional environment and embed it within Arab and regional systems of interest. If human and military settlement was the tool of the twentieth century, then “soft settlement” through economic, cultural, and political means appears to be the tool of the twenty-first century.
Notably, the Abraham Accords are not presented as a purely Israeli project, but as a regional peace initiative under international sponsorship, led by the United States as the political and security guarantor. This American role extends beyond symbolic mediation to include security guarantees, economic incentives, and joint investment projects, making participation in these accords attractive to some states from the perspective of immediate interests, particularly amid economic crises or regional security challenges.
The central question, however, is not what the Abraham Accords have achieved so far, but what they aim to achieve in the medium and long term.
When examining the components of these agreements and the political and economic initiatives branching from them, one can discern what resembles a future roadmap. If this project succeeds as planned, Israel—backed by clear U.S. support—could evolve into a regional pole in the Middle East, not only militarily but also economically, politically, and diplomatically. In such a scenario, Tel Aviv, or even Jerusalem, would become a regional center hosting economic conferences and political forums—and possibly summits—with permanent offices for regional or international organizations, similar to the roles played by Geneva, Vienna, London, or Rome in the international system.
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More dangerously, there are no guarantees that once the Abraham Accords stabilize after several years, attempts will not be made to redraw the region’s maps, or to replicate approaches similar to the gamble of recognizing a secessionist region of Somalia (Somaliland) as an independent and sovereign state, or to push for comparable scenarios in other countries and regions of the Middle East or the Horn of Africa. The absence of firm legal and political guarantees opens the door to the future use of these accords as instruments for reshaping political geography, not merely diplomatic relations.
Such a transformation, if realized, would not be the result of paper agreements or diplomatic ceremonies alone, but of a deep and gradual binding of regional interests to Israel. This linkage may at times be voluntary, driven by economic, technological, and security interests, and at other times coercive, shaped by power asymmetries and political or international pressure. In both cases, disentangling from this emerging system would become extremely difficult and potentially very costly, politically and economically.
In this context, Israel does not appear as a neutral party in this transformation, but as a central actor and decision-maker. A state seeking to end its isolation does not do so in order to dissolve into its surroundings, but to reshape those surroundings in line with its strategic interests. Over time, regional states may find themselves dealing with Israel not merely as a partner, but as a regional reference point that determines—sometimes softly, sometimes forcefully—the future direction of relationships and policies.
Nevertheless, this trajectory remains fraught with challenges and obstacles. The Palestinian issue, despite attempts to bypass or marginalize it, remains unresolved and continues to represent a permanent source of tension that threatens the sustainability of any comprehensive normalization project. Moreover, popular acceptance in many Arab societies remains limited, rendering normalization in many cases an elite-driven process rather than a deeply rooted societal transformation. In addition, changes in U.S. administrations or shifts in international power balances could affect the momentum and continuity of this project.
The Abraham Accords can be viewed as an attempt to close a long historical chapter of open conflict and to open a new phase of conditional integration. They do not represent the end of history in the Middle East, but may mark the beginning of a different era, in which conflicts and interests are managed through new tools—less noisy, but deeper and more consequential. The open question remains whether this phase will lead to genuine and balanced stability that serves the peoples of the region, or to the reproduction of dominance in softer forms, yet more deeply entrenched and far-reaching in impact.
Ali Halane is a Somali journalist, researcher specializing in African and Middle Eastern affairs, and co-founder of the Somali Cultural Parliament.
The opinion expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.
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