Editor’s Note: This three-part series examines the political, legal, and regional implications of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, situating the development within historical precedent and Somalia’s contemporary federal realities. Drawing on the Harrar precedent and recent events in northern Somalia, the series analyzes how external recognition efforts, internal dissent, and regional security dynamics intersect, and outlines policy options aimed at preserving stability, sovereignty, and lawful political solutions”
1. Executive Summary
Israel’s December 26, 2025, recognition of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland sent shockwaves through Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s dormant, unilateral bid for statehood suddenly became a pressing regional issue. Somalia’s Federal Government decried Israel’s move as a violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, raising the dispute to the UN Security Council, where virtually all members reaffirmed Somalia’s unity.
The crisis is no longer just an internal Somali question; it now involves external alignments, security bargains, and the risk of proxy competition in the strategic Gulf of Aden.
Historical precedent offers guidance. In 1943–44, Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie faced foreign pressure to carve out an autonomous region in Harrar for Jewish refugees, a plan that even envisioned annexing parts of British Somaliland. Ethiopia firmly rejected this proposal as an unacceptable infringement on sovereignty and a dangerous precedent, insisting that no province could be ceded to external interests.
Ethiopia’s stance preserved its unity and established a principle: externally imposed autonomy schemes must be resisted to protect national cohesion. Today’s Somalia can draw from this Harrar lesson, rejecting unilateral recognitions while still addressing humanitarian and political issues through sovereign, internal solutions.
Somalia’s federal model provides a path forward. Somaliland’s push for independence has long been rooted in historical grievances, but its claims lack consensus across the territories it seeks to govern. Between 2023 and 2025, communities in Somaliland’s eastern regions—Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn—revolted against Hargeisa’s rule.
In February 2023, local leaders in Las Anod declared they would rejoin Somalia, leading to fierce clashes as Somaliland forces shelled the city. By mid-2023, Somaliland’s army had retreated, and the dissident regions organized themselves as SSC-Khaatumo (North Eastern State of Somalia).
In mid-2025, Somalia’s federal government formally recognized this new member state, demonstrating a constitutional alternative to secession: disgruntled regions can attain self-governance within Somalia’s federal system rather than breaking away. This outcome underscores a key policy point—inclusive federalism and power-sharing can address legitimate grievances without redrawing borders.
Going forward, Somali authorities and international partners must coordinate an effective response to the Somaliland recognition shock. This policy brief recommends concrete actions for the Federal Government of Somalia, international partners, and Somaliland’s own leadership.
The recommendations focus on preserving Somalia’s unity—in line with its Constitution and African Union principles—de-escalating conflicts on the ground, and pursuing dialogue and reform. By learning from the Harrar precedent and Somalia’s recent federal successes, stakeholders can avoid dangerous fragmentation of the Somali state and promote stability through lawful, negotiated means.
2. Historical Context: The Harrar Precedent and African Norms
In the mid-20th century, African leaders confronted proposals that tested their sovereignty and the integrity of colonial-era borders. The “Harrar Project” of 1943 is a striking example that resonates today.
Amid World War II, an international council floated a plan to create a semi-independent enclave for displaced European Jews in eastern Ethiopia’s Harrar province, even suggesting Britain cede Berbera and Zeila (in today’s Somaliland) to provide the entity with a seaport.
Emperor Haile Selassie’s government sympathized with the refugees’ plight but unequivocally rejected handing over Harrar. The imperial reply stressed that giving up a province for one group was “in no way consonant” with Ethiopia’s sovereignty.
Haile Selassie warned that such a move would set a dangerous precedent and harm Ethiopia’s citizens and economy. He firmly demanded that the plan “be now abandoned.” By standing its ground, Ethiopia preserved its post-war cohesion.
The lesson was clear: short-term international inducements cannot justify compromising core sovereignty, and any internal autonomy arrangement requires the consent of the sovereign state.
This Harrar case established a norm later codified in African diplomacy. In 1964, newly independent African states adopted the principle of inviolable inherited borders, now enshrined in Article 4(b) of the African Union’s Constitutive Act.
Ironically, Somalia itself was once an outlier to this norm; in the 1960s it pursued pan-Somali irredentism. Today, however, Somalia relies on the same principle to oppose Somaliland’s separation.
Somalia’s Provisional Constitution declares the country’s territory “inviolable and indivisible” and defines national borders as those of 1960. International law backs this stance. The UN Security Council has repeatedly affirmed Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, including in Resolution 2809 (2025) amid the Somaliland recognition crisis.
In short, both historical precedent and continental legal norms strongly support Somalia’s position that Somaliland cannot secede unilaterally.
3. Somaliland’s Quest and the 2025 Recognition Shock
Somaliland, the northwestern region of Somalia, has functioned as a de facto self-governing territory since 1991. When Somalia’s central government collapsed that year, Somaliland’s leaders in Hargeisa cited a distinct colonial history and grievous abuses by Siad Barre’s regime to justify reclaiming the independence they briefly held in 1960.
Over three decades, Somaliland built its own institutions, held elections, maintained relative peace, and even minted its own currency—effectively functioning as a state. Yet no country recognized Somaliland as independent, largely due to Africa’s united stance against altering borders.
Somalia’s Federal Government and the African Union consistently insisted that Somalia’s 1960 union must remain intact, offering Somaliland autonomy within a federal Somalia rather than sovereignty.
This long-standing diplomatic freeze abruptly ended in late 2025. On December 26, 2025, Israel broke ranks by formally recognizing the “Republic of Somaliland” as an independent country.
Israel’s prime minister framed the decision in geopolitical terms, linking it to the Abraham Accords and announcing security and economic cooperation with Somaliland. Somaliland’s government celebrated, hoping the breakthrough would prompt others to follow.
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However, reports soon surfaced that Hargeisa had made significant concessions for Israel’s support. Somali intelligence indicated Somaliland agreed to host an Israeli military facility on the Red Sea, formally join the Abraham Accords, and even consider resettling Palestinian refugees in its territory.
In effect, Somaliland appeared to trade strategic alignments for recognition—a move reminiscent of external “bargains” that raised alarms across the region.
Somalia’s reaction was swift and furious. Federal authorities in Mogadishu condemned Israel’s act as an “illegal aggression” and a “deliberate attack” on Somalia’s unity, vowing to use all diplomatic and legal means to defend internationally recognized borders.
Crucially, Somalia’s outrage found broad backing. Ethiopia, Djibouti, Turkey, Egypt, and the African Union all strongly supported Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The AU reiterated its unwavering commitment to the sanctity of Somalia’s borders and warned that accepting a breakaway region would set a dangerous precedent across Africa.
At the UN Security Council, almost every member—save Israel’s closest ally—criticized the recognition and reaffirmed that Somaliland is an integral part of Somalia. This unified response isolated Israel’s move as an anomaly.
Hargeisa’s “diplomatic breakthrough” thus triggered greater international isolation elsewhere, underscoring a harsh reality: unilateral recognition without Somalia’s consent inflames tensions and finds little acceptance under international law.
4. Internal Challenges: Opposition to Somaliland’s Rule
Despite its reputation for stability, Somaliland has long faced internal dissent that undermines its case for nationhood. Clan dynamics and unresolved grievances mean that not all residents consent to secession.
Early Internal Conflicts:
Only a few years after declaring independence, Somaliland descended into civil war (1994–1996) among Isaaq clan factions. Political power struggles turned violent, engulfing Hargeisa and other towns. Hundreds were killed before clan elders brokered peace. This episode showed that unity was not automatic, even within Somaliland’s core population.
Eastern Clan Resistance:
Somaliland’s claimed borders include regions—Sool, Sanaag, and parts of Cayn and Awdal—inhabited largely by non-Isaaq clans such as the Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, and Gadabursi. These communities have repeatedly rejected Somaliland’s authority, citing marginalization.
Tensions erupted in incidents like the Kalshaale conflict (2011), when Somaliland’s attempt to assert control in a Dhulbahante area led to armed clashes with local militias. These confrontations foreshadowed larger conflicts to come.
The Las Anod Uprising (2023):
Long-simmering grievances in Sool boiled over in late 2022 and 2023. After a series of assassinations and the shooting of protesters, the city of Las Anod rose up.
By early 2023, Dhulbahante fighters under the SSC-Khaatumo banner expelled Somaliland forces from the city. Somaliland’s army responded by shelling Las Anod for weeks, hitting hospitals, schools, and civilian infrastructure. More than 180,000 civilians were displaced.
Despite repeated ceasefire announcements from Hargeisa, fighting continued, and Somaliland lost control of most of Sool. Traditional leaders formally declared their complete rejection of Somaliland’s secession and reaffirmed loyalty to the Federal Republic of Somalia.
In Part 2, I will continue by examining how Somaliland’s leadership has responded to internal dissent and external pressure through competing narratives, security framing, and regional messaging, and how these strategies have influenced regional and international perceptions of the crisis.
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Mohamed Daahir is a Diplomacy and International Relations scholar who writes on geopolitics, governance, and strategic communication.
Email: modaahir14@gmail.com
* The opinion expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Dawan Africa.
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